ONE LINERS AND A POWERFUL FRIEND FOR OUR RESISTING SOLDIERS

THE ONE LINERS from UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE LAW below emphasizes that Congress may not delegate the power to Declare War to the president as that is an on the spot judgment designated to Congress by Article I. It also emphasizes that the Boston Appellate Court had no authority to rule on Doe v. Bush or allowed advocating their constitutional responsibility as by law the Boston Appellate Court was required to use their sua sponte authority for forwarding Doe v. Bush to the USSC! The Boston Appellate Court and the 108th Congress allowed the president to become the biggest 48-hour bully ever in the history of America and THE ONE LINERS go on to say there was no excuse for that, as SEPARATION OF POWERS confers on each branch the means to resist encroachment of the others. THE ONE LINERS:  

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) states, "that a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous. The Constitution is a compact enduring for more than our time, and one Congress cannot yield up its own powers, much less those of other Congresses to follow. Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) states, "The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment."   Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) Justice Marshal noted, "It will not be contended that Congress can delegate powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative." According to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 122 (1976), The principal function of the tripartite separation of powers is to protect individual liberty by providing a "safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S., at 380-382 (1989) and the Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison) state, separation of powers confers on each branch the means "to resist encroachments of the others" and 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 1.09, p. 68 (1958) acknowledges "The danger is not blended power; the danger is un-checked power". Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982) states, "Congress may not give away Article III "judicial" power to an Article I judge".   According to the USSC in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), "Our system of governments requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such adjudication may cause cannot justify the court's avoiding their constitutional responsibility."

A SOLDIER'S POWERFUL FRIEND IS THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 752 (1975) states, "The writ of habeas corpus occupies a position unique in our jurisprudence, the consequence of its historical importance as the ultimate safeguard against unjustifiable deprivations of liberty" especially restraints on liberty "not shared by the public in general" according to Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 240 (1963).  Therefore petitioning by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas review is appropriate. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 144 (1953) has provided a scope of review clarified in Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 203 (5th Cir. 1975) that, "Military court-martial convictions are subject to collateral review by federal civil courts on petitions for writs of habeas corpus where it is asserted that the court-martial(s) acted without jurisdiction, or that substantial constitutional rights have been violated, or that exceptional circumstances have been presented which are so fundamentally defective as to result in a miscarriage of justice (as the) the military must accord to its personnel the protections of basic constitutional rights essential to a fair trial and the guarantee of due process of law." All of the Calley criteria are met by all our punished Resisting Soldiers of Conscience for conducting habeas review. In Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 46 (1972) Justice Douglas noted, "I agree with the Court’s view that habeas corpus is an overriding remedy to test the jurisdiction of the military to try or to detain a person." As the Supreme Court stated over thirty years ago; the federal courts may grant the writ "within their respective jurisdictions." Essential liberties may not be robbed from our Resisting Soldiers of Conscience due to the contrived war powers of the president as that is contrary to two centuries of U.S. Supreme Court Case Law: Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 335 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring) (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866)). As the Supreme Court noted in a different era, "war power cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation. Even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties." United States v. Robel, 398 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).